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The issue before our panel today is a subpart of a larger question: Are
obligations assumed by states under international human rights treaties
applicable extraterritorially during periods of armed conflict and military
occupation? Do the protections provided by the international human rights
treaties normally apply extraterritorially, outside the government-governed
relationship? If so, what is the precise relationship between the protections
provided under human rights instruments and international humanitarian law
(the law of war) in cases of armed conflict or military occupation?
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Even though the atrocities committed during World War II served as a
catalyst for the development of the International Covenants on Human Rights'
as well as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the linkage between human rights
and humanitarian law has never been clear. The traditional view has been to
distinguish the two: "the two systems are complementary," Jean Pictet
observes, but "humanitarian law is valid only in the case of armed conflict
while human rights are essentially applicable in peacetime."2 Proponents of
this position have noted that the original paradigm of human rights governed
relations between the state and its own nationals; on the other hand, the law of
war dealt with those concerning the state and enemy nationals, and
humanitarian law was intended primarily to protect enemy noncombatants.
More recently, a conflicting school of thought has concluded that "[t]he
conventional division between the law of war and the law of peace is no longer
tenable" and that "the law of war no longer automatically excludes the
application of the law of peace."3 Last year, the International Court of Justice
indicated in its advisory opinion Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,4 that the provisions of the
Covenants and the Convention on the Rights of the Child5 applied
extraterritorially during military occupation and that "the protection offered by
human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through
the provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the
[ICCPR]."6
In my view, this comment by the Court is not consistent with state practice
concerning the application of human rights treaties extraterritorially during
times of armed conflict and military occupation.' For example, during the
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR]Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter the Covenants].
2. JEAN PICTET, HuMANrrARIAN LAW AND PROTECTION OF WAR VIc-rims 15 (1975).
3. Dietrich Schindler, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Interrelationships of the Laws, 31
AM. U. L. REv. 935,941-42 (1982).
4. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1009 [hereinafter Wall Opinion].
5. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
6. Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 106.
7. The provisions of the two bodies of law may overlap when armed forces act solely within their
own territory in domestic armed conflict, since common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I of 1977 apply to a state's own nationals, as well as the international human rights
treaties. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32; Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 86; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
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recent military occupation of Iraq, the Commission on Human Rights called
upon parties only "to abide strictly by their obligations under international
humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions and the Hague
Regulations including those relating to essential civilian needs of the people of
Iraq." 8 Similarly, in Resolution 1483, the Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter, called upon "all concerned to comply fully with
their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907."' Subsequently, in
Resolutions 1511 and 1546, again acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the
Security Council authorized the multinational force "to take all necessary
measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq."'
Both resolutions also refer to the obligation of states to comply with
international humanitarian law. However, no mention is made of any obligation
on the part of states to comply with international human rights instruments.
During the briefing and argument of the Wall case, most states addressed only
jurisdictional issues, while a few summarily argued that Israel had violated the
Covenants, without substantively addressing the relationship between the two
bodies of law.
The Chairperson of our panel has posed several excellent questions
concerning the applicable law with regard to extraterritorial detention during
periods of armed conflict and military operation. I will use those questions as
a framework for my presentation this morning.
I. DOES EITHER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN OR HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
COVER EXTRATERRITORIAL DETENTION DURING PERIODS OF ARMED
CONFLICT?
As indicated above, states have considered the extraterritorial detention of
individuals during armed conflict or military occupation to be covered by
international humanitarian law. It is generally acknowledged that "[lthe
humanitarian law conventions offer far more protection than do the general
U.N.T.S. 287, 288 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] [collectively Geneva Conventions]; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflict, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter Protocol 1), and Protocol;24005;24005 Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereinafter Protocol I1) [collectively Additional
Protocols of 1977].
8. C.H.R. Res. 84, U.N. Doc. 2003/84 (Apr. 25, 2003). For the relevant instruments concerned,
see Geneva Conventions, supra note 7, and the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, annexed to Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
9. S.C. Res. 1483, 1 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
10. S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1546, 10, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1546 (June 8, 2004).
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guarantees of the human rights conventions."" For example, with respect to
detention, the protections in international human rights instruments generally
focus on restrictions to freedom following a criminal offence, where a final
decision has not been made in such cases by domestic courts. On the other
hand, these protections are defined in a far more precise manner in international
humanitarian law instruments for persons detained in situations of armed
conflict or military occupation. The Third Geneva Convention, as well as the
customary law of armed conflict, provides specific guidance concerning the
treatment of prisoners of war and enemy combatants, while the Fourth Geneva
Convention provides detailed rules concerning internment of civilians of enemy
nationality. Moreover, if international human rights treaties apply
extraterritorially, then the possibility of conflict with international humanitarian
law is all the greater. For example, Article 5 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) lists the cases when a person may be deprived of
liberty, but fails to mention the capture of prisoners of war or the internment of
civilians.1 2
The two human right instruments that are most relevant to our inquiry
concerning the application of human rights law to extraterritorial detention are
the ICCPR (with 155 states parties) and the ECHR (with forty-five states
parties). This presentation assumes that the relevant criteria for ascertaining
whether the standards set forth in these instruments apply to extraterritorial
detention must begin with the ordinary meaning of each instrument in its
context and in light of its object and purpose, its preparatory work, and state
practice thereunder-in short, the standard tools of treaty interpretation as set
forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 3
A. Scope of Application Provisions of the ICCPR and ECHR
While both the ECHR and the ICCPR reflect a territorial notion of
jurisdiction, their specific scope of application is different. Article 1 of the
ECHR states that "the High Contracting Party shall secure to everyone within
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in section 1 of the
Convention." On the other hand, Article 2(1) of the ICCPR stipulates that
"[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant without discrimination of any kind."
11. Schindler, supra note 3, at 940.
12. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 1. While
the U.S. is not a party to this Convention, the principles for treaty interpretation are recognized as part of
customary international law.
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Hence, on the basis of the plain and ordinary meaning of the scope of
application provisions, the reach of the ECHR would appear to be broader than
that of the ICCPR. The ECHR applies to anyone within the jurisdiction of a
state, while the ICCPR applies to individuals who are both within its territory
and subject to its sovereign authority.
B. Preparatory Work of ICCPR
What was the reason for the difference in the scope of application
provisions of the two instruments? The preparatory work of the Covenant
actually establishes that the reference to "within its territory" was included in
Article 2(1) in part to make clear that states were not obligated to secure the
rights therein in territories under military occupation. In 1950 the draft text of
Article 2 then under consideration by the Commission on Human Rights, like
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, would have required
that each state ensure Covenant rights to everyone "within its jurisdiction." The
United States, however, proposed the addition of "within its territory."'4
Eleanor Roosevelt, the U.S. representative and then-chair of the Commission,
emphasized that the United States was "particularly anxious" that it not assume
"an obligation to ensure the rights recognized in it to the citizens of countries
under United States occupation" or in what she characterized as "leased
territory.""s She explained:
The purpose of the proposed addition [is] to make it clear that the
draft Covenant would apply only to persons within the territory and
subject to the jurisdiction of the contracting states. The United States
[is] afraid that without [the proposed] addition the draft Covenant
might be construed as obliging the contracting State[ ] to enact
legislation concerning persons, who although outside its territory were
technically within its jurisdiction for certain purposes. An illustration
would be the occupied territories of Germany, Austria and Japan:
persons within those countries were subject to the jurisdiction of the
occupying States in certain respects, but were outside the scope of
legislation of those States. Another illustration would be leased
territories; some countries leased certain territories from others for
14. Compilation of the Comments of Governments on the Draft International Covenant on Human
Rights and on the Proposed AdditionalArticles, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 6th Sess. at 14, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/365 (1950) (U.S. proposal). The U.S. amendment added the words "territory and subject to its"
before "jurisdiction" in Article 2(1). Id.
15. Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Third Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
6th Sess., 193rd mtg. at 13, 18, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 193 at 13, 18 (1950); Summary Record of the Hundred
and Ninety-Fourth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 6th Sess., 194rd mtg. at 5, 9, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR. 194 (1950) (statements of Eleanor Roosevelt).
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limited purposes, and there might be a question of conflicting
authority between the lessor nation and the lessee nation. 6
Several delegations spoke against the U.S. amendment, including Ren6
Cassin (France) and Charles Malik (Lebanon). They argued that a nation
should guarantee fundamental rights to its citizens abroad as well as at home.'7
However, the U.S. amendment was ultimately adopted at the 1950 session by
a vote of 8-2 with five abstentions. 8 Subsequently, after similar debates, the
United States and others defeated French proposals to delete the phrase "within
its territory" at both the 1952 session of the Commission 9 and the 1963 session
of the General Assembly.2" As Egon Schwelb concludes:
The words "within its territory" amount to a limitation of the scope of
the Covenant in regard to which the Covenant differs, e.g., from the
European Convention on Human Rights, by Art. 1 of which the High
Contracting Parties undertook to secure the rights "to everyone within
their jurisdiction." Misgivings about this restriction were felt both in
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and in the General
Assembly. In a separate vote on the words "within its territory" these
words were retained, however.2
C. Subsequent Practice Concerning ICCPR
Initially, commentators endorsed a literal reading of Article 2(1), and
further argued that Covenant obligations applied, in the context of armed
conflict, only with respect to acts of a state's armed forces executed within that
2territory. The Human Rights Committee first departed from this literal
16. Summary Record of the Hundred and Thirty-Eighth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
6th Sess., 138th mtg at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.138 (1950).
17. See Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Third Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts.
Comm., 6th Sess., 193rd mtg. at 21, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/SR.193 (1950) (proposal by Ren6 Cassin (France));
Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Third Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 6th Sess.,
193rd mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.193 (1950) (statement by Charles Malik (Lebanon)).
18. Summary Recordofthe HundredandNinety-Fourth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
6th Sess., 194rd mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.194 (1950).
19. Draft International Convention on Human Rights and Measures of Implementation, U.N.
ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 8th Sess., Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/L.161 (1952) (French amendment);
Summary Record of the Three Hundred and Twenty-Ninth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 8th
Sess., 329th mtg. at 14, UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.329 (1952) (vote rejecting amendment).
20. U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 18th Sess., 1259th mtg. 30, U.N. Doc. AIC.3/SR.1259 (1963)
(rejection of French and Chinese proposal to delete "within its territory").
21. Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of the International Covenants on Human Rights of December
1966, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 103, 109 (Asbjorn Eide & August Schou eds.,
1968).
22. See, e.g. Manfred Nowak, The Effectiveness of the International Covenant on Civil and
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reading of Article 2(1) in several early decisions on individual communications
(cited with approval by the International Court of Justice in its Wall opinion),
where it found that it had jurisdiction in "exceptional instances" when state
agents had taken unlawful action against citizens of that state living abroad.23
However, these opinions support the position that the provisions of the ICCPR
do not apply extraterritorially in situations of armed conflict and military
occupation. In two of those cases (L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay and Celiberti v.
Uruguay), involving exceptional instances where Uruguayan state agents
abducted citizens living abroad into Uruguayan territory, Committee member
Christian Tomuschat observed that "[t]he formula [within its territory] was
intended to take care of objective difficulties which might impede the
implementation of the Covenant in specific situations." He specifically cited
occupation of foreign territory as an "example of situations which the drafters
of the Covenant had in mind when they confined the obligation of States parties
to their own territory."24
More recently, the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No.
31 (May 2004) abandoned the literal reading altogether, taking the position that
the enjoyment of Covenant rights is not limited to citizens of States
Parties but must also be available to all individuals... who may find
themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State
Party. This principle also applies to those within the power or
effective control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its
territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or
effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national
Political Rights-Stocktaking After the First Eleven Sessions of the UN-Human Rights Committee, 1 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 136, 156 (1980); MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL.,NEW RULESFOR VICTIMSOFARMED CONFLICTS 635
(1982).
23. In its Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 109, the International Court of Justice cited the Human
Rights Committee's views in U.N. Human Rights Committee, L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, Commc'n No.
52/1979, UN Doc. CCPR!C/13/D/52/1979 (1981) [hereinafter L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay] ; U.N. Human
Rights Committee, Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 56/1979, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/13/D/56/1979 (1981) [hereinafter Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay]; and U.N. Human Rights
Committee, Montero v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. 106/1981, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, at 136 (1983/1990).
24. L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, supra note 23, appendix.
Tomuschat further stated:
Never, was it envisaged ... to grant States parties unfettered discretionary power to
carry out wilful and deliberate attacks against the freedom and personal integrity of
their citizens living abroad. Consequently, despite the wording of article 2(1), the
events which took place outside Uruguay come within the purview of the Covenant.
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contingent of a State Party assigned to an international peace-keeping
or peace enforcement operation.25
The ICJ' s conclusion in its Wall advisory opinion that the ICCPR extends
to the West Bank and Gaza appears to have been based upon the unusual
circumstances of Israel's prolonged occupation. The Court did not cite General
Comment No. 31 in its opinion. Instead, it relied on earlier concluding
observations of the Committee concerning "the long-standing presence of Israel
in [the occupied] territories, Israel's ambiguous attitude toward their future
status, as well as the exercise of effective jurisdiction by Israeliforces therein"
and the Committee's conclusion that
in the current circumstances, the provisions of the Covenant apply to
the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all
conduct by the State party's authorities or agents in those territories
that affect[s] the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and
fall[s] within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the
principles of public international law.26
Indeed, the Court's specific holding was founded on ICCPR Article 12(1),
which contains an express territorial limitation: "Everyone lawfully within the
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence." Thus, arguably the most
logical reading of the Court's advisory opinion is that it was based only on the
view that the West Bank and Gaza were part of the "territory" of Israel for
purposes of the application of the Covenant.
The Committee's recent interpretation of Article 2 in General Comment
No. 31, while departing from the territorial approach clearly intended by the
negotiators, nonetheless finds support in the work of some distinguished
commentators who argue that the phrase "within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction" should be read as a disjunctive conjunction.27 However, Manfred
Nowak, in his commentary on the ICCPR, disagrees:
25. General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States
Parties to the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.13 (May, 26, 2004) (emphasis added).
26. Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 110 (emphasis added) (quoting U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
63rd Sess., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel 18/08/1998, U.N. Docs.
CCPR/CI79/Add.93, 10 (1998); U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 78th Sess., Concluding Observations of
the Human Rights Committee: Israel 21/08/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR, 11 (2003)).
27. See e.g. Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible
Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HuMAN RIGHTS 72, 74 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Theodor
Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 79 (1995).
[The] grammatical (re)interpretation in the sense of a "disjunctive
conjunction" . . . fails, however, to convince because ... States are
not responsible for all violations of the Covenant on their territory
(e.g., by insurgents, by occupation forces, etc.). The correct
interpretation, which is oriented on the purpose of the Covenant in
light of its historical background, was convincingly presented by
Tomuschat in individual opinions in L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, No.
52/1979, and Celiberti v. Uruguay, No. 56/1979.2"
The effective control rationale employed by the Human Rights Committee
in concluding that Israel was responsible for implementing Covenant rights in
occupied territory is also doubtful, especially outside the context of a long-term
occupation. As Professor Tomuschat observes, "Normally a state lacks
consolidated institutions abroad that would be in a position to provide to an
aggrieved individual all the guarantees, which in particular, Articles 9 and 14
CCPR require., 29 In all events, as he points out, the position taken by the
Human Rights Committee, that Israel is responsible for implementing the
Covenant in the occupied territories "to the extent that it exercise[s] 'effective
control,"' is not supported by the text of the ICCPR. "[T]his broad construction
of Article 2(2) may give rise to serious doubts as to the proper role of the
[Committee]. Is it authorized to interpret the CCPR in an authentic fashion?
The language of Article 2(2) is relatively clear."3
States have also expressed disagreement with the Committee's view that
the Covenant applies to acts of a state's armed forces performed outside that
state's territory. For example, in its recent periodic report to the Committee on
Human Rights concerning the implementation of ICCPR, the United States has
once again taken the position that the provisions of the treaty do not apply
outside the territory of a State at any time.3' Earlier, the Netherlands challenged
a request by the Committee on Human Rights to provide information about the
fall of Srebrenica.32 The Netherlands told the Committee that:
28. Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR COMMENTARY 43 (2d
rev. ed. 2005).
29. CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, HumAN RIGHTS: BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM 110 (2003).
30. Id.
31. U.S. DEP'T OFSTATE, UNITED STATES SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT CONCERNINGTHE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (2005), available at
http://www.state.uov/g/drl/rls/55504.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). The United States also informed the
Committee during the presentation of its initial report that "[t]he Covenant was not regarded as having
extraterritorial application" because of the "dual requirement" of Article 2(1). Summary Record ofthe 1405th
Meeting: United States of America, 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR. 1405 (Mar. 31, 1995).
32. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Netherlands, 27, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/CO/72/NET (Aug. 27,2001).
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[t]he Government disagrees with the Committee's suggestion that the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
are applicable to the conduct of Dutch blue helmets in Srebrenica....
Article 2 of the Covenant clearly states that each State Party
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals "within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction" the rights recognized in the
Covenant, including the right to life enshrined in article 6. It goes
without saying that the citizens of Srebrenica, vis-b-vis the
Netherlands, do not come within the scope of that provision.33
What is even more important, although various overseas military missions
involving states parties have been undertaken since the adoption of the
Covenant, most recently in Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the former
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), not one state has indicated, by making
a derogation from those rights as provided under Article 4 of the Covenant, a
belief that its actions abroad constituted an exercise of jurisdiction under the
Covenant. All derogations under Article 4 have been lodged with respect to
internal laws only.34
D. Subsequent Practice Concerning ECHR
In its recent decision in Bankovic v. Belgium, the Grand Chamber of the
European Court of Human Rights relied upon similar state practice with respect
to derogations in finding that victims of the extraterritorial acts by NATO
forces in bombing the headquarters of Radio Television Serbia were not "within
the jurisdiction" of the member states for purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR.35
The European Court stated that "Article 1 of the Convention must be
considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial notion of
jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special
justification in the particular circumstances of each case."36 Perhaps most
significant for present purposes, the Court described the territorial scope of
Article 2 of the ICCPR as having been "definitively and specifically confined"
by the drafters. "[I]t is difficult to suggest," the Court observed, "that
exceptional recognition by the Human Rights Committee of certain instances
of extra-territorial jurisdiction (and the applicants give one example only
33. Replies of the Government of the Netherlands to the concerns expressed by the Human Rights
Committee: Netherlands, 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/72/NET/Add.I (Apr. 9, 2003).
34. MULTILATERALTREATIES DEPOSrrED WITH THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, ch.4.4, available
athttp://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bibleenglishintemetbiblepartltchapterlV/chapterV.asp (last visited Oct.
8, 2005).
35. Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.
36. Id. 37.
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[Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay]) displaces in any way the territorial jurisdiction
expressly conferred by" Article 2(l)."
By contrast, in its earlier decisions involving Cyprus and Turkey, the
European Court had concluded that a state's responsibility may be engaged
where, as a consequence of military action, whether lawful or unlawful, it
exercises effective control outside its national territory.38 In Bankovic,
however, the Court pointed out that in contrast to the situation in Cyprus, the
FRY had not ratified the European Convention prior to the bombing and that
"the desirability of avoiding a gap or vacuum in human rights' protection has
so far been relied on by the Court in favour of establishing jurisdiction when
the territory in question was one that, but for the specific circumstances, would
normally be covered by the Convention."39
One of the key conclusions of the European Court in Bankovic was that the
obligations of Article 1 of the ECHR could not be divided under the effective
control rationale. The Court observed that: "The wording of Article I does not
provide any support for the applicants' suggestion that the positive obligation
in Article 1 ... can be divided in accordance with the particular circumstances
of the extraterritorial act in question."4 ° Subsequently, the Court also confirmed
in Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia that if the ECHR applies under the effective
control rationale, a state's responsibility is not confined to the acts of its
soldiers or officials in that area but also extends to acts of the local administra-
tion.4
Recently, two courts struggled with the application of the ECHR in Iraq.
Although it ultimately rejected the case on other grounds, a chamber of the
European Court cast doubt on the significance of Bankovic in Issa v. Turkey,
a case involving a large-scale cross-border raid by Turkish military forces into
northern Iraq. The Chamber relied on the views of the Human Rights
Committee in Lopez Burgos and Celiberti (which, as discussed above, had been
cited with approval by the ICJ in its Wall opinion) as evidencing a broad
jurisdictional exception-that "the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to
allow a state party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of
another state, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory."42 Even more
recently, in Al Skeini & Others v. Secretary of State for Defence, which
involved alleged violations of rights under the ECHR by British occupation
forces in Iraq, the England and Wales High Court concluded that the "broad
37. Id. 54.
38. See Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995); Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur.
Ct. H.R. 2216, 2234-35; Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (Grand Chamber).
39. Bankovic, XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 1 80.
40. Id. 175.
41. Ilascu v. Moldova and Russia, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 316.
42. Issa v. Turkey, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 71.
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dicta" of Issa were "inconsistent with Bankovic."4 The High Court found, inter
alia, that it did not have "broad, world-wide extra-territorial personal jurisdic-
tion" over "the case of deaths as a result of military operations" since "it would
drive a coach and horses through the narrow exceptions" recognized in
Bankovic and because "there would be nothing to stop jurisdiction arising, or
potentially arising, across the whole range of rights and freedoms protected by
the Convention."" The Court did find that the case of an individual who had
been arrested by British forces on charges of terrorism and was being held in
"a British military prison, operating in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi
sovereign authorities," and not as a "prisoner of war," "falls within a narrowly
limited exception exemplified by embassies, consulates, vessels and aircraft,
and in the case of Hess v. United Kingdom, a prison.""
E. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
Is Article 43 of the Hague Regulations of any relevance? It specifically
provides that an occupying power must take "all the measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting,
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Where the
territorial sovereign has not ratified a treaty prior to the commencement of the
occupation, is the administrator of the occupied territory required to preserve
the rights of the territorial sovereign, which chose not to ratify the particular
treaty?' Should Israel be deemed responsible for implementing the provisions
of the Covenants and the CROC in the West Bank and Gaza, even though those
treaties were not ratified by the territorial sovereign prior to the occupation?
If the treaties apply extraterritorially, should Israel for that reason remain
residually responsible for implementing the full range of rights and freedoms
protected in those instruments where it transferred most responsibilities for civil
government in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the Palestinian
Authority? "
43. Al Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Defense [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, In 263, 265 (Eng.).
44. Id. It 269, 284, 285. As a result the High Court dismissed appeals by relatives of five Iraqis
who died in shooting incidents in the southern Basra area.
45. Id. ft 286-87.
46. As Oppenheim points out: '"rhere is not an atom of sovereignty in the authority of the
occupant ..." L. Oppenheim, The Legal Relations Between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants, 33
L.Q. REV. 363, 364-65 (1917).
47. In its appearances before the international human rights treaty bodies, Israel has consistently
maintained that as a result of the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the 1995 Interim Agreement on the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip that it "has no say, control, or jurisdiction" over the Gaza Strip and in Areas
A and B of the West Bank, where the vast majority of the Palestinian population resides, and thus that it has
no ability to implement the rights enshrined in these treaties. See, e.g., STATE OF ISRAEL, IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE CONVENTION THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD IN ISRAEL: RESPONSE OF ISRAEL TO THE "LIST OF ITEMS TO
BE TAKEN UP IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSIDERATION OF THE INITIAL REPORT OF ISRAEL," 43 (2002),
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By way of example, the Coalition Provisional Authority did not attemptto mplmen •48
to implement he provisions of the Convention Against Torture in Iraq, as Iraq
had not ratified the treaty prior to the occupation. The Committee Against
Torture, in contending that the U.K had an obligation to implement the
provisions of the Convention in Iraq, "observe[d] that the Convention
protections extend to all territories under the jurisdiction of a State party and
considere[d] that this principle includes all areas under the de facto effective
control of the State party's authorities."49 Nonetheless, the United Kingdom
continued to maintain with respect to application of the Convention Against
Torture in Iraq that it "could not have taken legislative or judicial measures of
the kind envisaged since legislative authority was in the hands of the CPA and
judicial authority was largely in the hands of the Iraqi courts."50
The Human Rights Committee will no doubt face an uphill struggle in
seeking to implement its views on the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR
in situations of armed conflict and military occupation, even after the ICJ
decision. Unlike judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,5 the
views of the Human Rights Committee under the First Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR are not considered to be legally binding. 2 In any event, the
Committee's position in its General Comment No. 31 and in its concluding
observations concerning Israel is at odds with the plain meaning of Article 2(1),
the practice of states that have ratified the Covenant, and the original intent of
the negotiators.
available athttp://www.unhchr.chhtml/menu2/6/crcdoclreplies/wr-israel-l.pdf (last visited Mar. 11,2006).
48. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
49. Conclusions and Recommendations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
- Dependent Territories, I 4(b), U.N. Doc. CATICICRJ33/3 (Dec. 10, 2004).
50. Al Skeini, [2004] EWHC (Admin) 2911, 103. At the close of the negotiations on the
Convention Against Torture in 1984, the United States maintained that the treaty "was never intended to
apply to armed conflicts and thus supersede the 1949 Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law in armed
conflicts and the 1977 Protocols additional thereto." Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Working
Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 at 5. No delegation contradicted
the U.S. statement. See also Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/39/499, at 15 (1984) (statement
of Norway) ("For these kinds of armed conflicts, the Geneva Conventions and the First Additional Protocol
established a system of universal jurisdiction and of implementation that must be considered equal to the
system of the convention against torture.").
51. Article 46(2) of the European Convention, supra note 12, gives the Committee of Ministers
authority to ensure enforcement of any final judgments.
52. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 302. Article 5(4) of the Protocol gives the Committee only the authority to "forward its views
to the State Party concerned and to the individual." See, e.g., KIRSTEN YOUNG, THE LAW AND PROCESS OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 176 (2002); Christian Tomuschat, Evolving Procedural Rules: The UN
Human Rights Committee's First Years in Dealing with Individual Communications, 1 HUM. RTS. L.J. 249,
255 (1980). Additionally, only 105 out of the 155 states parties to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) have ratified the First Optional Protocol.
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II. IF BOTH HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLY, DOES THE
FORMER PREVAIL AS LEX SPECIALIS?
What explains the lack of notice of derogations by states concerning the
extraterritorial application of the Covenant and the European Convention
during periods of armed conflict and military occupation as discussed above?
Two possible legal theories suggest themselves: that states believe that the
obligations assumed under these instruments apply only within their territory
and not to acts of armed forces executed outside their territory; or that the lex
specialis of humanitarian law suspends the extraterritorial application of the
instruments during periods of armed conflict and military occupation. At times,
the United States has maintained both positions. For example, with respect to
the detainees in Guantanamo, the United States has taken the position that "the
ICCPR would not govern this case if it were otherwise privately enforceable
and applicable outside U.S. territory.... [The ICCPR] ... is intended to secure
'civil and political rights'-that is, the rights and obligations between a
government and the governed." Noting that the Guantdnamo detainees are
being held under the law of war, which "applies during armed conflict to
regulate interactions between governments and members of enemy forces," the
U.S. position states that this separate law of war "addresses specifically and in
detail obligations with respect to detainees seized in combat" and is the law that
"covers the detainees. 53
The ICJ Wall advisory opinion apparently recognizes that the lex specialis
of international humanitarian law may exclude the general application of the
provisions of the ICCPR during situations of armed conflict and military
occupation. The Court suggests that the specific protections provided by the
two categories of instruments could be split into three groups of rights: "some
rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may
be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both
these branches of international law."54 However, the Court did not offer
specific guidance on how to subdivide the rights into these categories. Without
further analysis of the lex specialis, the Court determined that Israel's security
barrier "impede[s] the liberty of movement of the inhabitants of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory ... as guaranteed under Article 12, paragraph 1, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."55
53. Brief for Appellees at 45-46, Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153
(9th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-55367). Plaintiffs had argued that the ICCPR creates judicially enforceable rights
that may be properly invoked in habeas corpus proceedings. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case without
reaching the issue.
54. Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 1 106.
55. 1d. 134.
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One important doorway to understanding the Court's opinion is its factual
determination that "the military operations leading to the occupation of the
West Bank in 1967 ended a long time ago."56 Under Article 6 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention, the provisions of the Convention ceased to apply in the
territory of Israel when the military operations ended and one year later in the
occupied territories. Thus, the Court's logic left it with a highly unusual
situation; while under Article 6 some of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Convention continued to apply to the extent Israel exercised the functions of
government, many other protections provided under the Convention relating to
civil and political rights were no longer applicable. In fact, the Court's finding
rendered inapplicable two provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention that
would appear to be in conflict with the relevant provisions of the ICCPR.
Articles 42 and 78 permit internment or placement in assigned residence of
protected persons where the security of the detaining power makes it absolutely
necessary.
In its earlier advisory opinion in Legality of the Threat or the Use of
Nuclear Weapons, the Court also observed in abstract terms that "the protection
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in
wartime, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. 57 The
Court further cautioned, however, that the "most directly relevant applicable
law ... is that relating to the use of force enshrined in the United Nations
Charter and the law applicable in armed conflict which regulates the conduct
of hostilities" and that "whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a
certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life
contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the
law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the
Covenant itself., 58 Hence, based on the reasoning employed by the ICJ in its
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, even if the provisions of the ICCPR could
be said to apply during periods of armed conflict, whether the detention of
combatants seized in armed conflict or the internment of civilians is "arbitrary"
under Article 9 of the ICCPR could only be decided by reference to
international humanitarian law.
Moreover, as the UN independent expert on the protection of human rights
in countering terrorism (Robert Goldman) recently observed, while the
"[h]uman rights treaty bodies have no common approach on how human rights
law relates to rules of international humanitarian law," the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has "looked to rules and standards of
56. Id. 125.
57. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 25
(July 8).
58. Id., U 25, 34.
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international humanitarian law .. as the lex specialis in interpreting and
applying the American Convention or the American Declaration in combat
situations." 59 For example, in the context of a case involving the Guantanamo
detainees the IACHR observed that:
In certain circumstances, however, the test for evaluating the
observance of a particular right, such as the right to liberty, in a
situation of armed conflict may be distinct from that applicable in
time of peace. In such situations, international law including the
jurisprudence of the Commission, dictates that it may be necessary to
deduce the applicable standard by reference to international
humanitarian law as the applicable lex specialis.'
In short, it would appear that the best reading of the interrelationship
between the ICCPR and international humanitarian law at least with respect to
detention of combatants or the internment of civilians, is the more traditional
view that international humanitarian law should be applied as the lex specialis
in determining what a state's obligations are during armed conflict or military
occupation.
Before turning to the question of derogations, I would like to consider
briefly the role that the Security Council has played in resolving possible
differences within the international community over what specific rules of
international law govern extraterritorial detention by multinational forces. The
Council has authority under Chapter VII, when necessary "to maintain or
restore international peace and security," to authorize measures that may be
inconsistent with otherwise applicable treaties. Under Article 103 of the UN
Charter, "[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail."
For example, the extraterritorial security detention currently employed by
the MNF in Iraq has been authorized by UN Security Council resolution 1546.
The resolution "[diecides that the multinational force shall have the authority
to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and
stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this resolution." The
59. U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm., Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, 29-30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/103 (Feb. 7, 2005).
60. Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures, Mar. 12,2002,41 LL.M. 532, 533. See also
OFFICEOFU.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER OFHUMAN RIGHTS, THE WORKING GROUPON ARBrrRARY DETENTION,
FACT SHEEr No. 26, ANNEx IV (stating that "Situations of armed conflict, covered by the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols, do not fall within the competence of the
Group"), available at http://www.ohchr.org/englishlabout/publications/docs/fs26.htm#A4 (last visited Mar.
19, 2006).
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letter from the U.S. Secretary of State annexed to the resolution states that the
MNF stands ready to continue to undertake a broad range of tasks to contribute
to the maintenance of security in Iraq, including "internment where this is
necessary for imperative reasons of security."
Recently, the United Kingdom's High Court of Justice issued an important
decision that addresses the authority of the MNF to detain security internees
under UNSCR 1546 and the relationship of that authority to the human rights
protections provided under Article 5 of the ECHR concerning arbitrary
detention. In Al Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defense, a British citizen who
had been detained for nine months by British forces in Iraq on security grounds
challenged the detention as inconsistent with the United Kingdom's domestic
law implementing Article 5 of the ECHR.6' The Court concluded that by
UNSCR 1546 the Security Council authorized the MNF "to continue the
powers exercisable in accordance with Article 78 of Geneva IV but inconsistent
with Article 5 of the ECHR" and "to intern those suspected of conduct creating
a serous threat to security in Iraq.' '62 The Court further found that since the
resolution was made under the provisions of the Charter, in particular those
authorities established under Chapter VII, "the resolution does.., in principle
override Article 5 of the Convention in relation to the claimant's detention in
Basra.
' 63
LII. IF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW APPLIES, WHAT IS THE PERMISSIBLE
SCOPE OF POSSIBLE DEROGATIONS?
As noted at the outset, the ICJ concluded in its Wall advisory opinion that
the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of
armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind
to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and that Israel had forfeited its right to derogate from the right to liberty
of movement because of its failure to give other states proper notification of
such an intent. The Court repeatedly emphasized that Israel's notification of
intent to derogate involved only Article 9 of the Covenant, "which deals with
the right to liberty and security of person and lays down the rules applicable in
cases of arrest or detention."' The other Articles of the Covenant therefore
remained applicable not only on Israeli territory, but also on the Occupied
Palestinian Territory.
Two issues would appear to present themselves in the context of our
discussion concerning extraterritorial detention: would states be able to
61. Al Jedda v. Sec'y of State for Defense, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 1809, (Eng).
62. Id. 7 92-93.
63. Id. 122.
64. Wall Opinion, supra note 4, 1 127.
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derogate from rights automatically if they are involved in an armed conflict or
military occupation; and could they derogate entirely from the protections
provided under international human rights instruments concerning arbitrary
detention.
A. Suspension of Rights Generally
Article 4(1) of the ICCPR, like Article 15 of the ECHR, provides that
states "may take measures derogating from their obligations" under the
Covenant "[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed." The article was based on
the constitutions or emergency legislation of states, including the United
Kingdom, empowering the head of state or government to declare a state of
emergency and suspend domestic rights, such as through denial of liberty of
movement, detention without trial, press censorship, and the creation of special
tribunals. The Uruguayan representative, during the negotiations of Article 4,
appears to have reflected the views of most delegations by emphasizing that the
executive is authorized to suspend constitutional guarantees "in most national
legislations. 65
As pointed out above, states in actual practice have notified other states
under ICCPR Article 4(3) of the suspension of their domestic laws during
periods of internal disturbance. But not one state has submitted a notice of
derogation suspending the application of the Covenant extraterritorially during
periods of international armed conflict or military occupation. Indeed, it is
difficult to see how generally states contributing troops to multilateral forces
would be able to suspend civil and political rights during periods of armed
conflict and military occupation. The individual states contributing troops to
a multinational force may or may not be party to the ICCPR, or, face a public
emergency that threatens the life of that nation as required by Article 4(1) of the
ICCPR. Could some members of a coalition suspend ICCPR rights
extraterritorially on behalf of other members?
This "state of legal uncertainty" concerning the ability of participating
states in a multilateral force to derogate from international human rights
instruments was one of the key factors that led the British High Court in Al
Jedda to conclude that the provisions of UNSCR 1546 applied in lieu of Article
5 of the ECHR. The Court observed that individual states contributing troops
to the MNF in Iraq might not face a "war or public emergency threatening the
life of the nation" as required by Articles 15 of the ECHR and that
"[p]articipating states need to know where they stand when faced with making
65. Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-fifth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum.
Rts., 6th Sess., 195th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.195 (1950) (statement of the representative of
Uruguay).
decisions at very short notice., 66 The Court also relied on the fact that no state
has derogated in relation to actions abroad at the invitation of the Security
Council since 1951.
The extraordinary and unprecedented proposition in the ICJ Wall case that
the provisions of international human rights instruments apply extraterritorially
unless there has been a specific derogation appears to put at risk the
participation by states in United Nations and other multinational operations
outside their own territory, by placing them in the position of undermining,
through their own liability, the human rights situations in territories where the
operations are conducted.
B. Permissible Scope of Derogations.
With respect to the permissible scope of derogations, Article 4(2) of the
ICCPR stipulates that no derogation may be made from Articles 6 (right not to
be arbitrarily deprived of one's life), 7 (prohibition of torture), 8 (prohibition
of slavery and servitude), 11 (prohibition of detention for debt), 15 (prohibition
of retroactive criminal laws), 16 (recognition as a person before the law), and
18 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion). However, the Human Rights
Committee in its General Comment No. 29 argued that the list of nonderogable
provisions in Article 4 is not exclusive and it proceeded to list a number of
additional rights from which no derogation could be made.67 For example, with
respect to detention, the Committee stated that "in order to protect
nonderogable rights, the right [under Article 9(4)] to take proceedings before
a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of
detention, must not be diminished by a state party's decision to derogate from
the Covenant. 68
Nonetheless, states in actual practice have frequently derogated from
Article 9 in its entirety with respect to their domestic legislation. As of October
12, 2005, twenty-seven states had submitted notifications under Article 4(3) of
the Covenant, with seventeen states derogating from Article 9 completely.
Moreover, the negotiating history of the Covenant establishes that states clearly
intended that Article 9 of the ICCPR could be suspended in its entirety (if it is
assumed that the provision applies to a particular conflict). During the 1950
drafting session of the Commission on Human Rights, the French proposed an
amendment that would have included Article 9 within the listing of
nonderogable rights under Article 4 of the ICCPR. At that time, Mrs. Roosevelt
proposed a sub-amendment that would have included only Article 9(4) (right
66. AiJedda, [2005] EWHC (Admin) 1809, 91.
67. General Comment No. 29, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev./Add.11, 13 (Aug. 31, 2001).
68. Id., 1 16.
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to challenge detention in court) 69 France hastily withdrew its entire proposal,
noting that it "was particularly opposed to the inclusion of paragraph [4] of
Article 9, from which any country in time of war would be forced to
derogate."70
During the negotiations, states were also particularly concerned that the
catalog of nonderogable rights contained in Article 4(2) not interfere with the
ability of states to intern enemy aliens. For example, at the 1950 session, states
rejected a proposal that would have made Article 26 of the Covenant
nonderogable (guaranteeing all persons equal protection of the law, and equal
and effective protection against discrimination), after several delegations
pointed out that it was impossible to treat enemy aliens on the same basis as
citizens during periods of armed conflict.7" The representative of the
Philippines stressed that "in time of war an early measure often taken by
Governments was the segregation of enemy aliens in detention camps" and that
while "[s]uch a measure constituted only temporary discrimination.... it was
evident that while in such camps the persons in question could not avail
themselves of the normal processes of law."72
When the General Assembly later reviewed Article 4 at its 1963 session,
states examined whether it was appropriate to make Article 23(2) nonderogable
as well (right of men and women to marry). The proposal was withdrawn after
several states maintained that they must be entitled to prevent marriage
domestically during periods of hostilities, because marriage would give enemy
nationals their spouse's nationality. The representative of the Netherlands
specifically reminded delegations that when the Germans had invaded his
country in May 1940, the "Government had found it necessary to intern persons
of German origin living in its territory, . . . due to the need to protect the
national security, and to the danger which Nazi infiltration had presented to the
country. 73
Thus, there is clear evidence in the negotiating record of the ICCPR that
much thought was devoted to deciding what articles would be nonderogable and
that omissions from the list in Article 4(2) were not inadvertent. In short, the
proposition that there are other nonderogable rights in the ICCPR in addition
69. Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-Sixth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR Hum. Rts. Comm.,
6th Sess., 196th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 196 (1950) (statement of Eleanor Roosevelt).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-fifth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 6th Sess., 195th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. EJCN.4/SR. 195 (1950) (statement of representative of
Belgium); Summary Recordofthe HundredandNinety-sixth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts.,
6th Sess., 196th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 196 (1950) (statement of Eleanor Roosevelt).
72. Summary Record of the Hundred and Ninety-fifth Meeting, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum.
Rts., 6th Sess., 196th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR. 196 (1950) (statement ofrepresentative of Philippines).
73. Summary Recordofthe HundredandNinety-fifth Meeting, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 18th Sess.,
1259th mtg. 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1259 (1963) (statement of representative of Netherlands).
to the catalog of nonderogable rights provided in Article 4(2) is doubtful, even
if it is assumed that states are obligated to derogate from the extraterritorial
application of human rights instruments during periods of armed conflict and
military occupation.
IV. IF ONLY HUMANITARIAN LAW APPLIES, WHAT CONSTRAINTS
DOES IT IMPOSE ON DETENTIONS?
The answer to the question would vary depending upon a series of
circumstances including, inter alia, whether:
1) The detention involves enemy combatants or civilian internees;
2) The conflict was international or of a non-international
character;
3) The UN Security Council authorized the particular detention;
4) The state in question had ratified the Additional Protocols of
1977 (or if relevant provisions in those instruments are
customary international law).
The adoption of the Additional Protocols of 1977 also supports the view
that states did not intend that there be a general merger of human rights and
international humanitarian law in situations of extraterritorial detention. Both
Protocols include various derogable and nonderogable rights contained in the
ICCPR. For example, Article 5 of Protocol II provides special and elaborated
protections for persons whose liberty has been restricted, including by
internment, while Article 75(3) of Protocol I expands on the derogable
protections provided in Article 9(2) of the ICCPR concerning the need to
inform detainees of the reason for their detention. On the other hand, states did
not include other specific guarantees provided for in the ICCPR within either
Protocol. As Dietrich Schindler concludes, "The adoption of the two 1977
Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions is a proof that a separate set of
rules for armed conflict is in fact what States want. ' 74
74. Dietrich Schindler, The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights, 208
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 3, 14 (1979). The ICRC gave the following reason for restating various provisions
of the ICCPR in Protocol II:
The system of protection set up by international humanitarian law... differs from that
provided by instruments on human rights. Nevertheless, the view was held that some
basic provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-parti-
cularly those from which no derogation may be made even in time of public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation-should be applicable in the context
of armed conflict.... As every legal instrument specifies its own field of application,
some of the Covenant's provisions have been restated within the framework of the
draft Protocol.
ICRC, DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12,1949: COMMENTARY 134
(No. CDDH/3, 1973).
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V. CONCLUSION
Doctrinal clarity is likely to advance respect for international norms in
conflict situations and specifically in the case of extraterritorial detention. This
does not mean, however, that more law is necessarily better, or that the two
branches of law-human rights and humanitarian law-should overlap. The
obligations assumed by states under the main international human rights
instruments were never intended to apply extraterritorially during periods of
armed conflict. Nor were they intended to replace the lex specialis of
international humanitarian law. This distinction is not a trivial one. Its
importance was fully understood by the architects of the Covenants.
To ignore this distinction in favor of the application of international human
rights instruments to situations of international armed conflict and military
occupation is, in effect, to ignore what the international community has agreed
upon. To ignore this distinction is to offer a dubious route toward increased
state compliance with international norms.
